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With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States
finds itself, for the first time since World War II, without
an immediately identifiable military threat to national
security. The extent and speed of change in the international
system was unimaginable even a few years ago. To the extent
that good public policy requires thoughtful planning, the
unanticipated changes have generated an acknowledged
requirement for reevaluation of national priorities,
particularly the size and structure of the armed forces. This
requirement takes on further importance when taken in the
context of the budget debate.
In recognition of the decreased threat and the tighter
budgetary climate, the Department of Defense (DOD) has
proposed budgets which recognize the need for a smaller active
force. Included in these budgets have been proposals for a
proportional reduction in the size and structure of the
reserve force. Although Congress has expressed enthusiasm for
reduction of the active force, they have opposed significant
cuts in the size and structure of the reserve force.
A statement made by General Colin Powell, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) , in congressional budgetary
testimony is indicative of the breadth of disagreement between
the DOD and the Congress over the reserve issue. When asked
about the consequences of not cutting the reserve force to a
level envisioned under DOD's proposed Base Force Concept,
Powell responded, "...we would badly imbalance the force. We
would be retaining reserve component structure and capability
that is not needed." (Powell, 1992)
One difficulty in coming to a consensus on the most
efficient force structure is in the area of determining likely
scenarios in which the armed forces will be used and the
active/reserve force mix required to effectively carry out the
anticipated missions. DOD has outlined its understanding of
post -Cold War military requirements in the Base Force Concept.
In an attempt to understand the effects of any significant
changes in the force structure, Congress recently has mandated
that DOD conduct an independent assessment of the structure
and mix of active and reserve forces. This mandate requires
the Secretary of Defense to "...submit to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a
report containing an assessment of a wide range of
alternatives relating to the structure and mix of active and
reserve forces appropriate for carrying out assigned missions
in the mid- to-late-1990s . " (U.S. House of Representatives,
1991)
In addition to this congressional mandate, the Navy is
currently reviewing the reserve issue on several fronts . The
Naval Reserve Project at the Center for Naval Warfare Studies
at the Naval War College has developed the Innovative Naval
Reserve Concept to address the realities of force reduction
and changing mission requirements.
Recommendations made to and mandated by Congress along
with the Navy's own reevaluation of the reserves will
inevitably result in a requirement to substantially modify
current reserve force command and administrative structure.
This anticipated requirement along with the experience of
reserve participation in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm
provide an excellent starting point for analysis of the
existing structure. In particular, a need exists for an
examination of the manpower distribution of Naval Reserve re-
enforcing and sustaining (augment) units along with an
appraisal of their organizational effectiveness.
B. OBJECTIVES
The objective of this thesis is to examine the
effectiveness of Naval Reserve augment units in meeting the
manpower requirements of the active forces. Given that the
organizational efficiency of the reserves and manpower
requirements of the active forces were exercised during
Operation Desert Storm, lessons learned from that experience
will be compared to organizational assumptions which existed
prior to the call up.
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary research question of this thesis is, "Are the
present manpower requirements and organizational assumptions
regarding Naval Reserve augment units still valid?"
Additional issues to be addressed include:
Discussion of the manpower distribution of the Naval
reserve between commissioned units and augment units
Discussion of the geopolitical assumptions of the Base
Force Concept and how they differ from the Cold War
assumptions of the Total Force era
Analysis of the organizational structure of the Naval
reserve
Analysis of the criteria for determining mobilization
manpower and training requirements
Examination of management review findings and
consideration of lessons learned from Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm
Recommendations for changes in Naval Reserve force
mission and organization
D. SCOPE
The focus of this thesis will be on the rationale and
assumptions behind the billet structure and administration of
augment units and how they compare to actual mobilization
requirements and anticipated changes in mission requirements.
Many of the total wartime manpower requirements for the active
forces are identified in the augment units. Unlike
commissioned reserve hardware units, such as Reserve Force
Squadrons (RESFORONS) and Reserve Force Ships, augment units
are assigned to meet the wartime manpower requirements of
active duty commands during mobilization. As can be seen from
the distribution figures in Table 1-1, augment units account
for 88 percent of Selected Naval Reserve manpower.
Table 1-1 NAVAL RESERVE MANPOWER DISTRIBUTION
















This thesis is based on an examination of Department of
Defense studies and policy statements, Center for Naval
Analysis studies, Center for Naval Warfare Studies proposals,
papers, and historical research, Department of the Navy
studies, internal documents, inspection and audit reports, and
instructions, and personal interviews. The dynamic nature of
the current debate about the future of the reserves in general
has made many existing instructions, policies, and funding
assumptions tenuous at best as there now exist almost as many
recommendations, studies, and opinions as there are questions
as to the future of the reserves. Although a proliferation of
analysis on the reserve issue exists, a commonality of themes
emerged in this analysis. Many of these themes are age old
and predate the historic and economic circumstances driving
the current debate. Among these themes are:
• The historical dichotomous relationship between the
Selected Reserves and Reserve force headquarters.
• Historical misconceptions and poor communication between
Gaining Commands, Selected Reserves, and Reserve force
headquarters
.
• The proliferation of "stove pipe" commands within the
Naval Reserve with a resultant administrative duplication
and blurring of the chain of command.
• The chronic difficulty in reconciling mobilization
training requirements with a reasonable means of
effectively measuring readiness.
(CINCPACFLTDET42 0, 1988)
Many of these issues have for years been the topic of
debate within the Navy and, especially, the reserve community.
Because, in recent years, the reserves have been particularly
productive, especially in the areas of contributory support,
there existed little incentive to take on these particularly
complicated issues. With the shrinking of the total defense
budget and the mandate to redefine and possibly expand the
role of the reserves, there now exists a constructive climate
to address these issues.
Obviously conclusive results from this type of analysis
are difficult to establish, especially since the Congress has
yet to determine the levels for reserve funding, and the Navy-
has yet to complete its own analysis.
F. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
The following list of acronyms and abbreviations is
provided in the interests of clarification.
Navy Manpower Data Accounting System (NMDAS) - Operated by
OP- 01, NMDAS contains inputs from resource sponsors and
manpower claimants to determine active duty and reserve unit
billet structures.
Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMOS) - Initiated in
1978 and brought on line in 1983, NAMOS uses information in
the Ship, Shore, and Squadron Manpower Documents to determine
mobilization manpower requirements. (KOSTIUK, 1988)
Reserve Force Squadron (RESFORON) - Reserve force aircraft
squadrons, RESFORONS are the functional equivalent of active
duty aviation squadrons except that they are manned by active
duty TARs and selected reservists.
Reserve Headquarters Support (RHS) - RHS is an automated
training and manpower tracking system used in the day to day
management of the Naval Reserve force. This system was
formerly known as Reserve Training Support System (RTSS)
.
Reserve Unit Assignment Document (RUAD) - This document
,
generated by RTSS, lists reserve unit billet structure, billet
mobilization description and individual readiness
calculations
.
Selected Reserve (SELRES) - Personnel assigned to Selected
Reserve units, SELRES are reservists in training programs,
individual mobilization augmentees, and full time support
personnel. (Department of Defense, 1990)
Ship Manpower Document (SMD) - Started in 1966, the SMD is
designed to determine the minimum number and quality of
positions needed on board ship in a wartime environment at
sea.
Shore Manpower Document (SHMD) - The SHMD applies
industrial engineering and management analysis techniques to
determine and document shore -manpower requirements. Unlike
the SMD and SQMD program, the SHMD program is used solely for
determining peacetime personnel requirements. The NAMOS
system uses the SHMD results and adjusts them for expected
workload changes to get an estimate of mobilization
requirements.
Squadron Manpower Document (SQMD) - The SQMD is designed to
determine the minimum number and quality of positions needed
on board a squadron during wartime. (Kostiuk, 1988)
Training and Administration of Reserves (TARs) - TARs are
active duty reserve personnel who specialize in full time
reserve support
.
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
The thesis is divided into seven chapters as follows:
Chapter I: INTRODUCTION
Chapter II: BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter describes the current and historical
circumstances driving the debate regarding the role and
structure of the reserve force. The roles of the reserves
under the Total Force Concept and under the proposed Base
Force Concept are discussed. Other studies and initiatives
regarding the reserve forces are also examined. Finally the
political implications of the budget process and the role of
the Congress, independent of DOD concerns, are examined.
Chapter III: RESERVE FORCE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
This chapter discusses the various Naval Reserve command
structures as they have evolved since the end of World War II.
The consolidation of the Naval Reserve force and the present
structure is examined, with particular emphasis on the
organization of augment units under the Gaining Command
Concept
.
Chapter IV: RESERVE MANPOWER AND MOBILIZATION
REQUIREMENTS
This chapter examines the rationale and methodology used
to determine manpower and individual training requirements for
mobilization.
Chapter V: ANALYSIS
This chapter looks at conflicting issues within the areas
of management, organization, ADP infrastructure, manpower, and
training in the management of Naval Reserve augment units
.
Additionally, the experience and lessons learned from
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm are compared to pre-
existing mobilization assumptions.
Chapter VI: THE INNOVATIVE NAVAL RESERVE
This chapter examines the current proposals for changing
the mission of the Naval Reserve. Specific recommendations
from the Innovative Naval Reserve Concept which have been
adopted or rejected are discussed.
Chapter VII: CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter presents conclusions drawn from the findings
and analysis presented, and makes specific recommendations for
organizational change within the Naval Reserve.
H. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the realignment of
national priorities has provided for a complete reevaluation
of the size and structure of the armed forces. The present
Naval Reserve force, particularly the gaining command concept,
is built on a total mobilization for global war concept which
is no longer applicable. As outlined by the Innovative Naval
Reserve Concept, the present organizational structure of the
10
Naval Reserve is in need of reform to reflect the anticipated
future roles of the reserve force. The exact nature of the
reserve/active mix will largely be a function of the reserve
force that DOD and Congress are developing. The new reserve
organizational structure and redefinition of reserve missions
may be larger than the force recommended by DOD as a result of
congressional policy directives.
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II. BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW
A. BACKGROUND
The size of the active duty military has largely been a
function of the perceived external threat to national security
as well as occasional expeditionary requirements when deemed
appropriate to the national interest. Manpower requirements
for the active force have been met in a number of ways, from
conscription (when necessary) to the present-day All -Volunteer
Force.
Throughout the history of our Republic, reserve forces
have been an essential element in the composition of the armed
forces. The existence of reserve forces, their close
identification with specific localities and, in some cases,
individual personalities, have served to make the reserve
forces a measurable ingredient of the social and economic
fabric of the country. As described by Goldich, "American
military reserve policies and the attitudes that led to them
are outgrowths of England's military tradition of manning its
armies with contingents raised locally and commanded by the
local nobility or gentry." (Wilson, 1985 pg.9)
When historians speak of the great battles of the American
Civil War, specific actions are nearly always portrayed in
terms of the distinctive volunteer units involved. Typical
12
examples are the historical accounts of the battle of
Gettysburg. In that battle, the critical engagement was at
Little Round Top on the Union left. Rather than a decisive
skirmish of Union troops engaging Confederate troops,
historians describe the battle in terms of the heroic actions
of the 20th Volunteers of Maine, led by Professor (Colonel)
Joshua L. Chamberlain, against the 4th, 15th, and 47th
Volunteers of Alabama. (McPherson, 1988) This and countless
other illustrations of the traditional concept of "citizen
soldier" are often overlooked by the professional military
establishment in understanding the historical role and social
significance of the non-professional military in our society.
B. STRATEGIC CONCERNS
The fundamental strategic assumption behind the present
structure of the reserve force, global war against the Soviet
Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, has dominated military
manpower planning since the end of World War II. The present
strategic situation is profoundly different from that of just
one year ago. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact was so rapid that defense planners have scarcely been
able to keep up with the pace of changes in the international
system.
As characterized by CJCS General Colin Powell: "Future
threats to U.S. interests are inherent in the uncertainty and
instability of a rapidly changing world." (Joint Chiefs of
13
Staff, 1992) Typical of the possible future scenarios was the
largely unforseen conflict with Iraq in Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm.
Although the reserves have been used sparingly since World
War II, the recent experience of Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm illustrates the regional conflict scenario
outlined in DOD's Base Force Concept, as well as the
feasibility and increased political acceptability of using the
reserves in future conflicts. (Downey, 1991)
C. TOTAL FORCE POLICY
Initiated in 1970 by Secretary of Defense Melvin
Laird, the Total Force Concept was introduced to address the
economic and political necessity to streamline the military
following the end of the Vietnam war. As outlined by Gotz and
Brown, the Total Force Concept
"....stipulated that all elements of the active force
structure- -including not only active and reserve
components, but also civil servants in the DOD, civilian
contractors, and retired military personnel- -should be
considered concurrently in developing military capability
in support of national military objectives. In essence,
the total force policy states that missions should be
given to whichever component can achieve them most
economically. The intent of the policy is to make better
use of the reserve components and to save money by
shifting some of the functions formerly performed solely
by active units to the reserves and other personnel."
(Gotz and Brown, 1991)
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The Total Force Concept also corresponded with the Nixon
Doctrine which attempted to redefine the exercise of American
power through increased diplomatic involvement and direct
military participation by treaty allies and regional powers.
(Kissinger, 1979)
From the manpower perspective, a significant element of
the Total Force Concept was the eventual replacement of the
draft with the all -volunteer force, and the stated intent to
use reserve manpower as an "initial and primary source of
augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency
requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active
forces." (Laird, 1970, pp. 1-2)
Although the Total Force Concept was officially embraced
by the Navy, Cronin points out in the following analysis of
the Total Force that an apparent contradiction existed between
acknowledgement of Total Force and the active reductions of
the Naval Reserve during the early to mid 1970' s. The period
of demobilization and retrenchment that characterized the
decade of the 70 's forced the Navy to recommend policy that
was seemingly at odds with the concept of increased reserve
participation under the Total Force. In its budget requests
in the 1970' s, the Navy consistently requested smaller
reductions in active duty manpower billets and increased
reductions in reserve manpower billets.
Under increasing skepticism and apprehension from Congress
and reserve advocacy groups, the Navy rationalized its
15
proposals for a smaller Naval Reserve force. The Navy argued
that in an era of rapid ship demobilization and replacement
with fewer but larger and more sophisticated ships requiring
larger crews, steeper reductions in active duty manpower
requirements were not justified. If the smaller fleet was to
maintain the commitments to forward deployment then it would
be difficult to identify missions to shift to the reserve
force. The strategic thinking at that time also envisioned
a quick and decisive war with the Soviet Union which would not
last long enough for Naval Reserve participation to be of
significant value.
Additionally, the all-volunteer force necessitated
increased expenditures on educational and bonus incentives to
recruit and retain even a minimum number of required
reservists. Rather than shifting funds from procurement and
operating budgets from the active side, logic dictated
consolidating the existing reserve force and, therefore,
spending more money on the same number of reservists. In
summary, the decade of the 70 's was a time in which the "one
Navy" concept implied under the Total Force did not take
place. (Cronin, 1987)
In 1980, with the incoming Reagan administration, there
came a mandate to modernize and expand the size of the active
forces. As articulated by the newly appointed Secretary of
the Navy (and Naval reservist)
,
John Lehman, the
administration became committed to the establishment of a 600
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ship Navy. A new "maritime strategy, " designed to carry the
war to the enemy, required effective utilization of all
components of the Navy, especially the reserves.
During the buildup, manpower planning took on special
significance as the Naval Reserve was not able to meet all of
its manpower requirements. It was during this time that the
Naval Reserve became increasingly involved with "mutual
support." The idea of mutual support was to integrate reserve
training with direct support to the fleet. Through creative
concepts such as Weekend Away Training (WET/IDTT) , reservists
were to get hands-on training with active units or skill
utilization similar to their mobilization requirements.
(Cronin, 1987)
In some cases, such as the Naval Reserve Intelligence
Command, a substantial portion of fleet intelligence
production and direct intelligence support has for years been
increasingly provided by Naval reservists and has served as
the model for direct support and horizontal integration with
the active forces.
D. THE NEW NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY/BASE FORCE
As mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of
1986, to provide assistance to the President's National
Security Strategy and Defense Planning Guidance for the
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff has developed the New National Military Strategy (NNMS)
.
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The NNMS acknowledges the realities of the changed world order
brought on by the collapse of the Soviet Union and calls for
a refocusing of defense policy and force structure. Under
this strategy, the following assumptions are made:
The world is still a dangerous place despite the
disintegration of the Soviet Union.
There exists a high degree of uncertainty as to the
ultimate reconstitution of the former Soviet Union and
the consequences of dealing with a multi-polar vice bi-
polar political environment.
The United States, by necessity, must still remain a
major participant in world affairs.
Declining budgets for the military are a political and
economic reality. (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992)
1. THE BASE FORCE
The NNMS requires that the U.S. retain the ability to
act unilaterally, if necessary, to promote stated U.S.
interests. To that end, the military structure required to
maintain that capability is outlined under the Base Force
Concept. Although not a force organizational structure, the
Base Force envisions four conceptual force packages and four
support functions to carry out the NNMS. As outlined in the










• Research and Development (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992)
2 . FOUNDATIONS
As outlined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
fundamental strategic premise of the NNMS is that the U.S.
must retain the ability to detect and respond to the
challenges of the future.
a. Strategic Deterrence and Defense
The continued existence of thousands of nuclear
weapons and the uncertain nature of their command, control and
possible proliferation necessitate the capability of the U.S.
to maintain adequate detection and deterrent capabilities.
i>. Forward Presence
Commitment and credibility to our allies along with
the enhancement of regional stability require a forward
deployed force to protect our security interests.
c. Crisis Response
The capability to maintain a credible force to respond
rapidly to regional crises is necessary to execute the NNMS.
The bi -polar nature of the international system suggests that
19
a regional crises and short notice military contingencies
capability must be preserved.
d. Reconstitution
The capability to regenerate credible new fighting
forces is an essential element in forestalling any potential
military adversary from competing militarily with the U.S.
This includes drawing on cadre- type units, military assets,
mobilizing previously trained or new manpower, and activating
the industrial base on a large scale.
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992)
E. CONGRESSIONAL/BUDGET CONCERNS
There remains, however, disagreement between the DOD and
reserve advocates in Congress as to what reserve/active mix
will be funded by the Congress to most effectively meet these
new mission requirements . The military manpower end strength
authorizations and appropriations for fiscal year (FY) 1992
shown in table 2-1 illustrate the disagreement between the DOD
and Congress
.
For fiscal year 1992, Congress approved the President's
active end strength request which included significant
reductions for the active force but added back approxamately
67,000 more reserve billets than requested. The DOD has
complained that as Congress adds back reserve billets, the
resultant change in the active/reserve ratio in end strength
unnecessarily complicates the defense planning process. In an
20
attempt to moderate the conflict on this issue, a
congressionally-mandated study is to make recommendations on
the consequences of a variety of active/reserve force mix
options. Under the congressional mandate, the National
Defense Research Institute (NDRI) , a federally funded research
TABLE 2-1 FY 1992 DOD MANPOWER REQUESTS/AND CONGRESSIONAL
ACTIONS
END STRENGTH AUTHORIZATIONS
REQUEST HOUSE SENATE CONFERENCE
GUARD/
RESERVE
1,068,400 1,135,876 1,140,760 1,135,896
ACTIVE 1,886,400 1,886,400 1,886,400 1,886,400
END STRENGTH APPROPRIATIONS
REQUEST HOUSE SENATE CONFERENCE
GUARD/
RESERVE
1,068,400 1,176,991 1,140,760 1,119,547
ACTIVE 1,886,400 1,886,400 1,886,400 1,886,400
Sources: 102d Congress 1st Session House Report 102-95
102d Congress 1st Session Senate Report 102-154
21
102d Congress 2nd Session House Report 102-527
and development center (FFRDC) operated by the RAND
corporation, has been selected to conduct the study. The
interim report of this study, published in May 1992, contains
a brief review of the need for the assessment and a detailed
description of the methodology to be used. (Rand, 1992) The
final report is due in December 1992.
The central issue in the debate between Congress and the
DOD involves the trade offs between reserve funding and the
credibility of the Base Force. As articulated by Secretary of
Defense Dick Cheney:
"If we cannot cut the reserve component, then we end up
having to cut down the active force even more. ... We end
up having to cut on operations and maintenance, and that
affects training, and that affects readiness. ... We end
up having to reduce modernization, our procurement... to
maintain the kind of quality infrastructure essential with
respect to a quality force." (DOD, 1992)
F. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Writings and studies of the past decade about the Naval
Reserve have concentrated almost exclusively on management,
manpower supply, retention, recruiting, readiness, and
compensation issues concerning the already existing reserve
force. (Curran, 1983; Curran and Quester, 1983; Feldman,
1985; Goldberg, 1985; Tyron, 1985; Domabyl , 1987; Hall, 1987;
Kostiuk and Grogan, 1987; Shiells and Fletcher, 1987; Kostiuk,
22
Follmann and Shiells, 1988) . Much of this analysis
concentrates on econometric analysis and statistical summaries
and their policy implications. It is important to note that
these studies pre-date the significant historical events and
changed economic circumstances of the last few years. They
are, therefore, somewhat extraneous to the present debate.
An examination of the current literature, including
Department of Defense proposals and policy statements, Center
for Naval Warfare Studies proposals, papers, internal
documents, instructions, inspection and audit reports, and
personal interviews, reveals the dynamic nature of the current
debate about the future of the reserves. In general, these
new proposals imply that many existing instructions, policy,
and funding assumptions are tenuous at best, as there now
exist almost as many recommendations and opinions as there are
questions about the future of the reserves. Ironically, the
Navy now faces the prospect of cutting back both active and
reserve manpower with no long-range plans or policy to
effectively execute the drawdown.
23
III. RESERVE FORCE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
A. BACKGROUND
The Naval Reserve has origins in the various state naval
militias which only came under full control of the Navy with
the Navy Militia Act of 1914. These state naval militias have
roots dating back to the colonial period. In some cases, New
York State, for example, the state naval militia still exists.
(Chaloupka et al . , U.S. Naval Reserve History )
B. POST WORLD WAR II ERA
The present day organizational structure of the Naval
Reserve has its origin in the reestablishment of a Naval
Reserve organization following the Second World War. Under
this reorganization, the Naval Air Reserve Training Command
was established in Glenview, Illinois in 1946. In 1956, the
Naval Reserve Training Command (non- aviation) was established
in Omaha, Nebraska. (Chaloupka et al
.
, U.S. Naval Reserve
History )
1. Naval Reserve (non-aviation)
The Naval Reserve Training Command encompassed non-
aviation units including surface and submarine reserve units.
a . Organ! za. tion
The primary responsibility for the training and
administration of the non-aviation Naval Reserve rested with
24
the Commandants of the now defunct Naval Districts. Naval
Districts exercised administrative control over all Naval
activities within their particular geographic area of
responsibility. Although formal responsibility rested with
the District Commandant himself, the District Deputy Chief of
Staff for Reserves for that particular district was the
primary administrative authority for reserve affairs within
that district. The District Commandant reported directly to
the Director of the Naval Reserve/ACNO-NR (Assistant Chief of
Naval Operations (Naval Reserve) . Following the establishment
of the Naval Reserve Training Command in 1956, the Naval
Districts' reporting responsibility shifted to the Chief of
Naval Reserve Training Command.
Within the Naval Districts, numerous Naval Reserve
training centers provided drill space, instruction, equipment,
and administrative support to drilling reservists. These
training and administrative support functions were usually
provided by a cadre of reservists on indefinite active duty
known as TAR's (Training and Administration for Reserves).
The commanding officers of the various reserve units normally
reported to the reserve center commanding officer (usually a
TAR) who in turn reported to the District Deputy Chief of
Staff for Reserves. (Mazza, 1992)
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b. Personnel/Mobilization
The basic organizational unit of the Naval Reserve
evolved from the concept of reserve units initially designated
for augmentation to a ship in the event of mobilization.
Since it was not always feasible for an entire unit to augment
a ship, it was decided to re-organize units as "surface
reserve divisions." Although the reserve divisions drilled
and trained together, each member of the division had an
individual mobilization billet corresponding to the needs of
the fleet. (Chaloupka et al
.
, U.S. Naval Reserve History )
The decentralized mobilization assignment policy was
the responsibility of the Naval Districts which matched fleet
mobilization requirements with qualifications of reservists
within their district. (Chaloupka et al
.
, U.S. Naval Reserve
History ) Each reservist was then provided with individual
mobilization orders and a government transportation request
which would become valid upon mobilization. If individual
mobilization requirements changed, the reservist was simply
given a new set of orders to reflect the change in
mobilization requirement. The inherent flexibility of this
system allowed for a more adaptable system in meeting
mobilization requirements. (Mazza, 1992)
2 . Naval Air Reserve
The organization of the post-war Naval Air Reserve was
distinctly different from that of the Naval Surface Reserve
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and transcended Naval District boundaries. (Chaloupka et al .
,
U.S. Naval Reserve History ) This was primarily due to the
unique nature of aviation which conceptually translated into




The training and administration of aviation squadrons
and units was primarily the responsibility of the commanding
officer of the Naval Reserve Air Station or the resident
Reserve Air Facility located at an Active Duty Air Station.
The reserve squadrons reported to the Reserve Air Station
Commanding officer who in turn reported to the Naval Air
Reserve Training Command. The Naval Air Reserve Training
Command then reported to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(Air) through the Naval Air Training Command.
b. Personnel/Mobilization
With the post -World War II surplus in naval aviators,
and the rapid transitions to modern aircraft in the regular
fleet, it became increasingly difficult for the Naval Air
Reserve to maintain a constant squadron/personnel ratio. As
a result, some aviation "squadrons" became personnel units
which shared the same set of aircraft with other squadrons on
different weekends. In the event of mobilization, only one of
the squadrons would actually use the aircraft while the other
squadrons dispersed to augment like- type active duty
squadrons. (Mazza, 1992)
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C. CONSOLIDATION AT NEW ORLEANS
With the introduction of the Total Force Policy in 1973,
the Naval Reserve began a major reorganization effort. As
described by Chaloupka et al . in U.S. Naval Reserve History ,
the first major change was the consolidation of the air and
surface reserve under a newly established Naval Reserve Force.
In 1973, the Commander, Naval Reserve Force (CNAVRES) was
established and headquartered in New Orleans, Louisiana.
CNAVRES was dual -hatted, also serving as the Director of Naval
Reserve. Also headquartered at New Orleans under the
Commander, Naval Reserve Force were the Commander, Naval Air
Reserve Force (COMNAVAIRESFOR) , and the Commander, Naval
Surface Reserve Force (COMNAVSURFRESFOR)
.
1. SURFACE RESERVE FORCE
a . Organ! za. tion
In 1976, the administrative control of Surface Reserve
training centers shifted from the Naval District Commandants
to the newly established Naval Reserve Readiness Commands
(REDCOMs) , covering geographic regions of the country not
necessarily corresponding to those regions covered by the old
Naval Districts.
Under this new organizational structure, the REDCOM
Commander reported to COMNAVSURFRESFOR. The actual reserve
unit commanding officers continued to report to the training
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center commanding officers, who now reported to the REDCOM
Commander.
b. Personnel/Mobilization
In the early 19 70' s, the Naval Reserve began a major
effort to align Naval Reserve units with active force
commands. This period of horizontal integration of reserve
units with active components was an effort to
institutionalize the "one Navy" concept originally envisioned
under the Total Force Concept. Naval surface reserve force
ships were horizontally integrated into the active fleet for
operational control. For non- hardware or augment units, this
was the beginning of the gaining command concept presently in
place.
Under the gaining command concept, training and
mobilization standards were developed and implemented through
input received from the active forces. Although not formally
institutionalized, direct or mutual support to active commands
greatly increased to the point where many essential warfare
and support functions are now carried out by the Naval
Reserve. (Chaloupka et al
.
, U.S. Naval Reserve History )
2. AIR RESERVE FORCE
Under the reorganization of 1973, Naval Air Reserve
Training Command at Glenview, Illinois was disestablished and
its responsibilities shifted to the newly created Commander,
Naval Air Reserve Force in New Orleans.
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a . Organ! za tion
As a practical matter, the consolidation and
reorganization of 1973 had less of an effect on the Naval Air
Reserve than on the surface reserve because the change in
command structure was less obvious. The Naval Air Reserve
essentially retained the same command, with most aviation
squadrons and augment units continuing to report
administratively to the Naval air station commanding officers.
Jb. Personnel/Mobilization
As with the surface reserve, Naval air reserve force
squadrons were horizontally integrated into the active force
operational aviation forces. The gaining command concept for
aviation augment units was also established.
D. SUMMARY
The present organizational structure of the Naval Reserve
has largely been a function of evolving strategic, political,
and budgetary concerns. As with any large organization, the
Naval Reserve is not without its critics. Much of the
criticism has come from within the Naval Reserve itself and
pertains to a wide range of administrative, command, and
organizational issues. Ordinarily, incremental change is
sufficient to address these issues. Because changes in the
strategic, political, and budgetary issues are now
revolutionary rather than evolutionary, incremental change may
no longer suffice.
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IV. RESERVE MANPOWER, MOBILIZATION, AND TRAINING
Naval Reserve manpower and mobilization requirements are
set fourth under the Department of Defense Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) , Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan (JSCP) , Naval Capabilities Mobilization Plan
(NCMP) and OPNAVINST 1001.21 (Naval Reserve Policy and Mission
Statement) . The presumptive principal guiding these
requirements has been the concept of full mobilization for
global war. (CINCPACFLT 420, 1992)
A. RESERVE MANPOWER MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENTS
As described by Kostiuk, the Navy's manpower
determinations process can be broken down into three
functional areas: (1) requirements determination, (2) billet
structuring, and (3) execution.
1. Requirements
The Navy's active and reserve manpower requirements
are both derived under the Navy Manpower Engineering Program
(NAVMEP) . NAVMEP incorporates the functions of the Ship
Manpower Document Program (SMD) , the Squadron Manpower
Document Program (SQMD) , the Shore Manpower Document Program
(SHMD) , and the Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMOS)
.
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Both the SMD and SQMD programs determine their
mobilization manpower requirements through an analysis of
functional tasks and the manpower needed to perform the
minimum of those tasks required in a wartime environment.
Reserve augmentation for these active hardware units is the
difference between the mobilization requirement and the
billets funded, or basic allowance (BA) for active duty
personnel during peacetime. Mobilization requirements for
shore -based commands are determined by the SHMD program which
applies manpower analysis techniques to determine and validate
shore manpower requirements.
Two methodologies are used to conduct shore -based
manpower analyses under the SHMD program. The first, Shore
Required Operational Capability (SHOROC) , translates activity
orientation to functional categories as defined by
responsibilities, assigned duties, and missions and tasks of
an organization. Functional categories are then further
broken down into specific required functional capabilities
which are tasks performed within functional categories. The
second is staffing standards, which most often incorporate
regression analysis to estimate the relationship between
SHOROC identified workloads and required manpower.
The NAMOS system is used to differentiate between
peacetime shore -based manpower requirements under the SHMD
program and manpower requirements for mobilization. NAMOS
uses a complicated time-phased task analysis to calculate
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workload changes expected at different intervals of the
mobilization process.
The manpower shortfalls identified between the BA for
hardware units and increased manpower required at mobilization
for shore-based commands are combined and incorporated into
the Navy Manpower Data Accounting System (NMDAS) . (Kostiuk,
1987)
2. Billet structuring
Using information contained in the NMDAS, billet
structuring is the responsibility of the Commander Naval
Reserve Force (COMNAVRESFOR) . Structured billets are
incorporated into the Reserve Unit Manpower Authorization
System (RUMAS) . Unfortunately, effective billet structuring
is no simple task. This is primarily due to the fact that the
present system design for the identification of mobilization
requirements and billet structuring does not account for
disparities between requirements, authorizations, and
inventory. Additional complications cited by Kostiuk include:
• Demographic constraints in filling required billets.
• Constraints on augmentation billet requirements for active
units necessary to form a corresponding reserve unit.
• Interface difficulties which prevent effective match up
between requirements identified in NMDAS and structured
billets identified in RUMAS.
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Because requirements and actual structured billets
reside on incompatible data bases, it is difficult for
resource sponsors to properly validate requirements with
billet structure. As Kostiuk points out, the consequences of
the inability to manage requirements with structured billets
are:
• Not all NMDAS identified requirements get structured or
authorized.
• The creation of "reserve management" billets to address
the realities of reserve unit and personnel
administration
.
• Creation of training billets in anticipation of
requirements result in billet creation unknown to the
sponsor.
• NMDAS-RUMAS interface difficulties resulting in
inefficient billet structuring and personnel assignment
which translates into inefficient mobilization. (Kostiuk,
1987)
3 . Execution
In addition to billet structuring, it is also the
responsibility of COMNAVRESFOR to recruit, assign, and train
qualified individuals to fill identified mobilization billets.
The ultimate test of an effective mobilization system is its
ability to effectively mobilize when required. Although the
recent mobilization of Naval reservists during Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm was technically a recall vice
mobilization, numerous discrepancies in the Navy's manpower
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mobilization process were identified. These problems will be
further discussed in Chapter V.
B . TRAINING
The stated mission of the Naval Reserve Force is:
To train and administer the Selected Reserve, including
management of all Naval Reserve resources to maintain the
highest possible readiness and to perform such other
functions as may be directed by the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) . More specifically, OPNAVINST 5430. 48C
states the mission is; To exercise for CNO, policy,
direction, control, administration, and management of the
Naval Reserve: to establish plans, programs, priorities,
organizations, procedures, and standards for the Naval
Reserve; to monitor the status of mobilization readiness
of Naval Reserve units and personnel; and to provide
budgetary support for Naval Reserve activities and
programs. (OP-095, 1991)
Individual mobilization billet training requirements
for Naval Reserve augment units are set by the gaining
command. There is no prescribed methodology to determine
training requirements, but rather the qualified judgement of
the gaining command as to what training would be required for
an individual to function effectively at mobilization. As
extrapolated from the mission statement of the Naval Reserve,
"training for mobilization" is one of the primary missions of
the Naval Reserve.
1. RESERVE HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT
The primary management tool used to monitor training
and readiness in the Naval Reserve is through the Reserve
Headquarters Support (RHS) , formerly known as Reserve Training
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Support System (RTSS) . The Director of Naval Reserve (OP- 095)
describes RHS as:
the official support and billet structuring and
assignment system for use by COMNAVRESFOR in the
mobilization of the Selected Reserve. It provides
automated readiness information, nationwide mobilization
billet exercise reporting, and data exchange of personnel
and training data between Reserve and Echelon III/IV
commands. (OP- 095 Congressional Back-Up Book)
a . Background
.
Winslow and Seeger's research into the origins and
history of the RTSS system provides the following summary.
Originally developed under various other names, the RTSS
system was an outgrowth of the Aviation Training Support
System (ATSS) , developed in the early 1970's by Ling Temco
Vought (LTV) Corporation. Its primary purpose was to
facilitate the training and scheduling of enlisted aircraft
maintenance personnel in active duty Navy aircraft squadrons.
The goal of the system was to assign required courses, monitor
training status, automate, and hopefully reduce, the paperwork
associated in the process. In 1977, the Naval Reserve
selected ATSS, later renamed RTSS, as the most efficient way
to monitor individual selected reserve training and measure
reserve unit readiness. In terms of fleet compatibility, pre-
existing ADP architecture, and developmental cost, adaptation
of ATSS was a logical choice. (Winslow and Seeger, 1985)
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As originally envisioned, the stated goals of the RTSS
system were as follows:
• An increase in the quantity and quality of SELRES
mobilization billet assignments at all command levels.
• Integration of personnel and training record data under a
single system accessible from remote locations.
• Reduction of time and training resource requirements
through individual SELRES diagnostic testing;
individualized instruction; and maintenance and
administration of syllabi and courseware.
• Reduction of time required for, and increase in accuracy
of, tracking trainee progress.
• Monitoring personnel readiness status.
• Improvement in the effectiveness and efficiency of
tracking trainee progress.
• Improvement in the reliability of training information at
all command levels.
• Reduction of administrative and clerical workload of
field, staff, and operating units.
(CNAVRES, 19 81)
Jb. Readiness Determination
Readiness calculations for individual selected
reservists and reserve units are calculated in RTSS in
accordance with COMNAVRESFORINST 3501. 1G. For the individual
reservist, readiness is measured by the percentage of training
achieved as documented by their training track. This
measurement is then entered into RTSS . RTSS generates the
reserve unit assignment document (RUAD) which depicts
individual readiness by a five letter code. The five letter
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code depicts percentage of readiness achieved, qualifications
outstanding to achieve 100% readiness, and date the code was
last updated.
Overall unit readiness is measured by a combination of
Personnel (P) ratings and Training (T) ratings. To compute
the "P" rating, the number of personnel assigned to
mobilization billets is divided by the number of mobilization
billets and multiplied by 100. The "T" rating is generated as
the sum of all readiness codes of personnel in mobilization
billets divided by the number of personnel in the mobilization
billets. The lower of these two percentages is selected as
the Overall Readiness (R) rating.
The "P" and "T" ratings range from PI 90-100%, P2 80-
89%, P3 55-79%, P4 00-54% and Tl 85-100%, T2 70-84%,
T3 55-69%, and T4 00-54% respectively.
The R ratings are defined as follows:
Rl: unit assigned personnel are fully ready for
mobilization and integration into the gaining
command.
R2 : unit personnel are substantially trained to
undertake the bulk of the gaining commands wartime
mission.
R3 : unit personnel are training to execute a major
portion of the gaining commands wartime mission.
R4 : unit personnel require additional training to meet
their mobilization requirements.
As it has evolved, RTSS has been expanded in an
ambitious attempt to completely automate the process of
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reserve training and administration. Unhappily, as late as
19 88 CNAVRES has failed to deliver a workable management
information system (MIS) for use in the Naval Reserve.
(CINCPACFLT DET 420, 19 88)
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V. ANALYSIS
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and ongoing
reorganization initiatives provide an excellent opportunity to
test many of the organizational assumptions of the Naval
Reserve against the reality of experience. The primary focus
of this chapter will be to outline some of the issues
pertaining to the Naval Reserve which have arisen as a
consequence of the experiences in the Persian Gulf and in
conjunction with other changes in the force structure. The
opportunity to resolve these issues is recognized as an
important factor in the broader context of reserve
reorganization and restructuring.
A. MANAGEMENT
In 19 88, Naval Reserve CINCPACFLT Detachment 420
(CINCPACFLT DET 42 0) conducted a management review and
organizational analysis of the Naval Reserve. The CINCPACFLT
Det 42 Management Assistance Team (MAT) was tasked by the
Director of Naval Reserve to conduct this analysis. Although
the emphasis was on the Naval Reserve Surface Force and
CNAVRES organization as a whole, their analysis addressed
issues encountered by the Naval Air Reserve Force as well.
The MAT findings maintained that the administrative and
organizational problems facing the Naval Reserve were a result
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of the Naval Reserve operating contrary to established Navy
principles of leadership, command, chain of command, teamwork,
completed staff work, and career incentives. (CINCPACFLT DET
420, 1988)
The MAT found that there was a prevailing failure to
comply with CNAVRES policy throughout the Naval Reserve.
Equally as serious as this non-compliance was the toleration
of willful non-compliance. Organizational disconnects, as
well as a lack of standardized command selection criteria,
were noted as a contributory factor in the observed widespread
lack of leadership.
The lack of organizational vigor in the Naval Reserve was
attributed to the double and triple hatting of commanders at
various echelons of command.
Numerous violations of the traditional notion of chain of
command were noted in which clear lines of authority and
responsibility were diffused through a myriad of "stove pipe"
commands within the Naval Reserve. The lack of
standardization of command authority and responsibility was
contrary to established Navy policy and tradition.
Fragmentation and rivalries between different segments of
the Naval Reserve has led to a breakdown of the traditional
concept of teamwork. This fragmentation has led to localized
politicalization of various reserve commands in which policies
and directives are promulgated that are not necessarily
consistent with the mission of the Naval Reserve.
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The MAT also noted a consistent lack of completed staff
work among the various levels of the Naval Reserve. Although
the MAT could not pin down the exact cause, it was speculated
that poor morale could be the cause of poor staffwork or that
poor staffwork could be a factor in poor morale. Poor
staffwork prior to the establishment of significant changes in
reserve policy or command authority has, in the past, led to
unnecessary administrative duplication, and prolonged
confusion over lines of legitimate command authority and
responsibility.
The MAT found that there were no criteria for selection of
qualified surface TARs in key reserve management positions.
Many positions on the CNAVRES and COMNAVSURFRESFOR staffs were
occupied by individuals with no field management experience.
Conversely, many in key field positions had no experience at
CNAVRES or COMNAVSURFRESFOR. The lack of an institutionalized
career path and reward system was cited as a deficiency in the
proper career development in the surface TAR community.
B. ORGANIZATION
The MAT further maintained that the structure of the Naval
Reserve force organization was in serious need of overhaul if
the identified management problems were to be rectified.
The MAT identified five major issues pertaining to the
organizational inefficiencies at CNAVRES. These issues
included inconsistency with mission, organizational
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disconnects, job definitions, and control of own destiny. The
following excerpts from chapter four of the MAT report
highlight these issues:
1. Inconsistency with Mission. Current COMNAVRESFOR and
COMNAVSURFRESFOR organizations are not consistent with the
Naval Reserve mission- -i.e. , to provide trained units and
qualified individuals upon mobilization.
• COMNAVRESFOR does not have training or readiness
functions; readiness and training functions [are] assigned
at Echelon 3 level while [the] planning function [is]
assigned at Echelon 2 level.
• COMNAVSURFRESFOR' s training functions [are] organized by
programs and training- related tasks, such as training
systems, without any director assigned for readiness or
planning for the Naval Surface Reserve Force. Program
officers tend to be narrowly focused and over- or under-
manage all aspects of the programs assigned including
details of units ACDUTRA [Active Duty for training] and
IDTT [weekend away for training] . Program officers are
not managing training or readiness; instead they often
become immersed in the day-to-day details of the units
within programs.
2 . Organizational Disconnects. Current COMNAVRESFOR
organization does not line up with OP-095 and Echelon 4
organizations which leads to organizational disconnects and
violations of the chain of command.
• COMNAVRESFOR does not have surface or air functions to
mate up with OP-095 surface and air divisions which leads
to direct communication between Echelons 1 and 3
.
COMNAVRESFOR as ISIC [immediate senior in charge] for
COMNAVSURFRESFOR and COMNAVAIRESFOR is cut out of chain of
command
.
• COMNAVSURFRESFOR and COMNAVAIRESFOR do not have manpower,
financial, MIS/ADP, and facilities functions to mate up
with REDCOMS and other Echelons 4 commands. This leads to
direct communication between Echelons 2 and 4.
COMNAVSURFRESFOR as ISIC for REDCOMs is cut out of chain
of command.
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COMNAVSURFRESFOR uses program officers which no longer are
included in REDCOM or REDCEN/RESCEN organizations. This
leads to direct communication between Echelon 3 and units.
3 . Unclear Job Definition. Current COMNAVRESFOR
organization manual does not define functions and jobs
clearly.
Staff Regulations have fuzzy definitions for majority of
jobs and use inactive and unclear terms such as "monitor"
and "coordinate" to describe jobs.
In some instances, the regulations define a job as
"assisting" DCOS and then list tasks of DCOS plus one or
two additional tasks. The additional tasks thus are the
only separation between assistants whose other tasks
necessarily overlap. Thus, poor definition blurs lines of
demarcation between assistants and complicates the entry
for communications between echelons. To the extent that
the additional activities are not included in the DCOS's
functions, the regulations imply that assistants perform
functions over which a superior has no supervision.
4. Control of Own Destiny. Most COMNAVSURFRESFOR and
COMNAVAIRESFOR staff personnel want their own manpower and
finance functions. Both desire to plan and program people
and money independent of each other. This would allow
competition for people and money at OP-095; some directors
at COMNAVSURFRESFOR believe that the present organization
prevents such competition because manpower and planning
functions are performed by COMNAVRESFOR, not by
COMNAVSURFRESFOR
.
COMNAVSURFRESFOR believes that it has been short -suited
in people and money for its programs. COMNAVAIRESFOR'
s
people oppose any organization by which the problems of
COMNAVSURFRESFOR may affect their training and readiness.
COMNAVSURFRESFOR believes that it has been denied the
opportunity to compete with COMNAVAIRESFOR on the merits and
to perform to the fullest. This is contradicted by
COMNAVSURFRESFOR' s rejecting opportunities to own its own
assets, e.g., rejection of NRF ships and agreement to shift
MIUW' s [mobile in-shore warfare units] to TYCOMs [type
commanders] . (CINCPACFLT DET 420, 1988)
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C. ADP INFRASTRUCTURE
The all encompassing nature of Reserve Headquarters
Support (RHS) in attempting to automate the process of
training and administration of the Naval Reserve has not been
without difficulty. The process of mobilization for Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm highlighted problems in the Naval
Reserve ADP infrastructure. Weaknesses in the RHS system are
a direct function of the underlying system structure. RHS is
only part of a larger, redundant, outdated, and poorly
designed ADP infrastructure in the Naval Reserve. With the
ultimate failure to eliminate duplication within the
infrastructure, RHS has not functioned as originally
envisioned. This is primarily due to the fact that the system
is dependent on information input derived from other data
bases outside the control of the RHS users.
RHS is largely dependent on data already provided on
hardcopy documents and available to local users. Unit inputs
are usually done on a monthly basis at the local drill site.
The existing data bases that have an input into the RHS system
are IMAPMIS (Inactive Manpower and Personnel Management
Information System) and NMDAS. RHS is extremely sensitive to
these two data bases. A mistake, omission, or change in these
data bases can render subsequent inputs into RHS useless, with
the added difficulty of the user having no knowledge or
control over the management of these other data bases
.
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For example, IMAPMIS inputs identify the member's
existence in the Naval Reserve. This data is input by the
local personnel office with no direct line of responsibility
to local reserve commands. Accordingly, if the person's
accession, loss, or status in the Naval Reserve is not
properly entered into IMAPMIS or entered in a timely manner,
the member is not recognized as existing in RHS. It is not
uncommon for six months to a year to pass before a reserve
gain or loss is properly recognized in IMAPMIS. Since IMAPMIS
and RHS files are reconciled on a regular basis with IMAPMIS
overriding RHS, the resulting inaccurate reports generated by
RHS contribute to the low degree of accuracy RHS has as a
useful measure of readiness.
Additionally, NMDAS inputs into RHS have from time to time
been erratic, resulting in RHS outputs in which the entire
billet structure has been changed, deleted, doubled or
otherwise manipulated, making reasonable month to month
calculations of readiness a function of phone conversation
consensus rather than objective quantitative measurement.
In the Naval Reserve, all policy formulation has centered
around readiness, the primary mission of the Naval Reserve.
In that regard, "official" readiness has been readiness as
measured by RHS. As the standard of readiness measurement,
RHS must be backed up with manual documentation for purposes
of accurate readiness reporting.
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Illustrative of the system's ultimate failure is the
continued inability of CNAVRES to accurately account for unit
readiness through RHS. Readiness is frequently determined by
informal phone contact between resident program managers at
CNAVRES and their program managers in the field to verify or
get an update on the readiness data generated at CNAVRES by
RHS. This practice has raised serious doubts as to the
credibility of RHS as an effective management tool. In the
field, the reserve units find themselves spending valuable
time in the documentation and input of RHS data that might
otherwise be spent on training.
D. MOBILIZATION
As described by Chaloupka et al
.
, the Reserve mobilization
process for Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield was the first
use of reserve forces under the presidential statutory
authority granted under Title 10 USC 673b. As distinguished
from other statutes which require a state of war or national
emergency as a prerequisite for reserve activation, Section
673b grants presidential authority for the use of up to
200,000 SELRES for operational requirements. Originally
passed in 1976 and later amended in 1980 and 1986, the
original intent of Section 673b was to invigorate the
credibility of reserve participation under the Total Force
Policy. The statute specifically sought to:
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promote reliance on the Reserve and U.S. military
capability. . .give the President greater flexibility in
foreign policy. . .and improve U.S. response capability and
international stability. (U.S. Senate, 1975)
The 1980 amendment to Section 673b increased the manpower
authorization from 50,000 to 100,000. The 1986 amendment
raised the manpower ceilings to 200,000 and doubled the
initial 90 day period to 180 days.
As further discussed by Chaloupka et al
. ,
prior to
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, issues concerning the
possible exercise of recall authority under 10 USC 673b were
raised during Global War Game (GWG) 89 conducted at the Naval
War College and the JCS Command Post Exercise (CPX) PROUD
EAGLE 90. Some of these issues proved to be prophetic when
compared to the experience of the actual call- up of Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
The significant issues raised in GWG 89 involved
misunderstandings and interpretations of terminology. The
first issue concerned the use of the word mobilization rather
than "Active force augmentation" or "Presidential recall" as
authorized under 673b. The use of the word "mobilization" has
both legal and historical implications which may not be
appropriate in certain circumstances. Concern was also
expressed that the subtleties of 673b and its significant
implications of a recall vs mobilization were not well
understood by civilian and military leaders. As experience
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later proved, the Naval Reserve has no standardized
administrative procedures to deal with a recall on the scale
of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
Another issue raised during GWG 89 was that the 200,000
recall authority was a rigid numerical requirement rather than
a ceiling under which various force -mix combinations could be
tailored to meet the given requirements.
An issue raised as a result of CPX PROUD EAGLE 9 was that
there were significant administrative planning and oversight
problems that might hinder timely SELRES activation. It was
also observed that there was a reliance on "base case" reserve
call-up scenarios rather than tailored, less than global war
type call-ups. Additionally, some units that are critical for
"front end" augmentation of major staffs were not cited as




The call-up of Naval Reservists during Operation Desert
Storm/Desert Shield was characterized by some of the
difficulties suggested by the exercise experiences. The
primary difficulty was that reserve augment unit organization
was based on the assumption of unit rather than individual
recall.
During Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, manpower
recall procedures were based on a quick build up to full
mobilization vs recall. As a result, there existed at
CNAVRES, the gaining commands, and within the units, no
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prioritization of critical individuals or billets to be filled
short of full mobilization.
Ad- hoc procedures had to be developed to identify billets
and individuals to mobilize. In some cases, specific
communities chose to limit reserve participation to volunteers
only, thereby denying some gaining commands access to the
entire pool of qualified reservists and putting into question
the concept of "involuntary recall." An already weak ADP
system (RHS) and incompatibility between reserve and active
duty ADP systems further complicated the process of
identification of individuals with billets.
E . MANPOWER
For the short term, manpower will not be a problem in the
reserves since the current downsizing will create a pool,
unprecedented in size, of qualified individuals available for
reserve affiliation. In addition, Congress will inevitably
agree to some cut in the size of the reserve force.
Long term manpower implications are more ominous since the
current drawdown methodologies suggested by Congress are
characterized more by explicit short term political concerns
rather than objective analysis.
When considering the future manpower requirements for the
reserves, public perceptions of the process by which the
current drawdown will be implemented will also be an issue.
As suggested by CJCS Gen. Powell in testimony to the Senate
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Armed Services Committee, the familial and generational
traditions of military service could be upset by a perception
of a "political feeding frenzy" in Congress over the military
budget. The resultant perception of a "breach of faith" by
the career active force could serve as an impediment to future
reconstitution of the active force if necessary. (POWELL,
1992)
Over time, the historical argument that "reserves are
cheaper than active forces" will also become less significant.
Since the present reserve force is composed primarily of
former active duty members, a shrinking active force will
diminish as a source for trained reserve manpower.
Consequently, the costs of maintaining reserves will go up
over time as the costs of training a gradually decreasing pool
of increasingly unqualified reservists are absorbed by the
reserves.
F . TRAINING
The primary challenge in carrying out training in the
Naval Reserve has been in the area of training standardization
and readiness accounting. Tremendous strides have been made
in recent years with the evolution of individual billet
training requirements as created by the gaining commands. As
a .practical matter, many of these requirements have been kept
sufficiently broad to facilitate the realities of training
across a broad spectrum of local environments.
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Since the Naval Reserve is in the business of training
with "readiness" as its ultimate product, there has evolved a
narrow focus on mobilization training at the expense of
contributory support. As the roles of reserves are expanded,
new measurement criteria must be developed. (Naval War
College, 1992)
Beyond the context of the changed strategic and fiscal
circumstances, the Naval Reserve faces numerous organizational
and management challenges in the areas of managerial
effectiveness, organizational continuity, management
information systems, mobilization procedures, manpower
planning, and training documentation. Given the changed
strategic and fiscal circumstances facing the leadership of
the reserves, there exists both the imperative and the
opportunity to meet these challenges.
A new reserve model based on the Innovative Naval Reserve
Concept recommends a dramatic shift from the traditional
missions and roles of the Naval Reserve and suggests the
opportunity to streamline the Naval Reserve organization.
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VI. THE INNOVATIVE NAVAL RESERVE
A. BACKGROUND
The most comprehensive Naval Reserve realignment plan put
forth to date is the "Innovative Naval Reserve Concept" (INRC)
as outlined in Naval Reserve 2000; Flexible Force for the
Future . (Chaloupka et al . , 1991) Incorporating the concepts
and assumptions of the New National Military Strategy, the
INRC makes recommendations for changes in Naval Reserve
mission areas, structure, readiness and training, and
administration. As amplified and further articulated in
subsequent Department of the Navy documents, the INRC has so
far served as a blueprint for the ongoing realignment of the
Naval Reserve force mission and organization.
B. STRATEGIC/FISCAL ASSUMPTIONS
The strategic and fiscal assumptions that are the
foundations of INRC parallel those of the New National
Military Strategy. These assumptions include a reduced threat
of a quick global war, continued or increased regional threats
with possible U.S. involvement, and the reality of declining
defense budgets while maintaining the requirement to remain
engaged in world affairs. Because these assumptions are so
fundamentally different from the Cold War focus of the last
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forty five years, there exists a requirement for a change in
reserve mission areas.
The consequences of such changes include the elimination
of mobilization training as the primary function of the Naval
Reserve, the creation of reserve forces readily accessible to
meet CINC requirements, and increased reserve contributory
support to maintain operational requirements with a reduced
active force. Chaloupka et al. provide the following
conceptual summary of the INRC.
C. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The conceptual framework of the INRC involves a
combination of Total Force participation of the Naval Reserve
under the NNMS, Total Quality Leadership (TQL) techniques, and
lessons learned from Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
To realize the full potential of the reserve element of the
Total Force Concept, the mission areas of the Naval Reserve
should mirror the strategic deterrence, forward presence,
crisis response and reconstitution "pillars" of the NNMS.
To implement these new roles for the Naval Reserve, it
will be necessary to change administrative practices in the
Naval Reserve. Specifically, the CNO has mandated
implementation of TQL into a decentralized reserve structure
to effect added accountability, removal of administrative




Lessons learned from Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm
provide a mandate for a reserve force configured to meet CINC
requirements, to smoothly carry out a tailored recall, and to
effectively utilize unique skills possessed by individual
reservists.
D. INNOVATIVE NAVAL RESERVE CONCEPTS
The concepts of the INRC outlined by Chaloupka et al . are
contained in the specific categories of mission areas,
structure, readiness and training, and administration.
1. MISSION AREAS
Under the broad assumption that the use of reserve
forces is cheaper than active forces, the INRC advocates
increased reserve participation in the areas of contributory
support and contingency response. The object of increased
contributory support is to provide maximum contributory
support to the GCs and other Naval activities. The emphasis
is on the required peacetime missions of medical, airlift,
maritime patrol, intelligence, and public affairs. The
primary benefit of increased contributory support is to
provide OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO relief for the active forces, direct
and flexible response to GC requirements as well as
maximization of training opportunities.
Utilizing the lessons learned in Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm, the INRC recommends the creation of a
reserve contingency response of approximately 20,000
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reservists for small regional crises or as a nucleus for a
larger regional crisis. The missions of the contingency force
would mirror the cargo handling, sealift, port security,
medical, airlift, combat search and rescue, logistics and
construction functions so effectively provided by Naval
Reservists during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
2 . STRUCTURE
To build a more responsive reserve organizational
structure, a decentralized customer driven organization is
necessary to facilitate a reserve organization aligned with
CINC/GC requirements. Decentralization would require a
transfer of some reserve administrative functions to the CINCs
and GCs through the transfer of existing reserve
administrative assets, primarily manpower and funds. Reserve
mission validation as a function of CINC/CG OPPLANS and
requirements would allow a customer driven approach to reserve
utilization. This would also allow the creation of
Contingency Reserve Forces for tailored recalls and
incorporation of those tailored recalls into CINC/CG OPPLANS.
Integration of the active and reserve forces mandated
under Total Force could be facilitated by elimination of
duplicate operational, training and support structures,
transfer of reserve resource sponsorship from the Naval
Reserve to the CINC/CGs, and integration of active and reserve
manpower data manpower databases. Accountability would be
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strengthened by a transfer of responsibility for readiness
criteria, training and support to the CINCs/CGs.
3. READINESS AND TRAINING
Under the INRC, readiness and training criteria would
continue to be set by the CINCs/GCs, who would also assume
responsibility for readiness training. Crisis response
capabilities would be enhanced by specialized training for
crisis -related missions, maintenance of war- fighting skills,
and emphasis on joint training missions. Enhancement of
contributory support missions would be facilitated through
training for non- traditional missions, performance based
training, cross- training, maximization of civilian skills,
movement of reserve billets closer to active duty commands,
and enlistment of veterans to support their previous active
duty commands
.
The key to such radical changes in traditional training
concepts is the introduction of flexibility to the
unnecessarily rigid drill and active duty requirements
presently in place. Increased flexibility in readiness and
training would provide for surge capability during crisis,
corporate memory for GCs, and relief for CGs during peak
periods.
4 . ADMINISTRATION
The effective implementation of the INRC would require
administrative changes designed to remove barriers to
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effective reserve utilization. Specifically, the INRC
recommends the transfer of order writing authority from
COMNAVRESFOR to the gaining commands, reasonable allowances
for flexible reserve drill, and active duty for training based
on customer driven requirements vice narrowly interpreted
statutory dictates. Equally important and so far missing from
the present reserve organization is the requirement for
implementation of effective management information systems to
provide CINCs/CGs/BUPERS with on-line access incorporating the
maintenance of a civilian skill inventory. Streamlining the
organization would require the transfer of reserve
administrative support to USN activities, decentralization of
administrative processing to meet the needs of the CINCs/CGs,





E. PROGRESS TO DATE
The Department of the Navy is already transitioning to
many of the concepts put forth in the INRC. Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) approval for a new model for the structure
and employment of Naval Reserve forces was announced on
January 23, 1992. (CNO, February 1992) The Secretary of the
Navy (SECNAV) , in his Program Objectives Memorandum (POM)
guidance for fiscal year 1994, summarizes the Navy's new
strategy with regard to the Reserves as follows:
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Reserve Programs . The role of the Naval Reserve must
change in recognition of the new security requirements.
Historically, the focus on the Naval Reserve has centered
on training for global war. Now, the focus must shift to
preparation for crisis response and support of the fleet
in peacetime through contributory support. (SECNAV, 1992)
The SECNAV guidance further specifies that planners:
• Consider transfer of CONUS -based fleet support missions to
the reserves
.
• Substitute reserve billets for active billets wherever
continuous coverage is not required, to the extent
feasible.
• Shift reserve billets between programs to provide
increased contributory support and/or improved crisis
response.
• Tailor the readiness of reserve organizations to provide
increased flexibility in employment.
• Consider reducing the reserve manning of active ship
augmentation units (other than tender augmentation units)
from the level required to support full wartime operations
(M+l) to that needed to support programmed billets
authorized (BA) . Further consider the establishment, on
each coast, of generic augmentation units for appropriate
classes of ships. (SECNAV, 1992)
As directed by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, a
complete review of selected reserve billet requirements by
Navy resource sponsors in coordination with all 3 6 manpower
claimants is currently underway. (CNO, June 1992) OP- 06
guidelines for the review define the concepts of flexible
readiness, crisis response, contributory support and review
guidance instructions. Recommendations from the reserve
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billet review are scheduled to be briefed to the CNO in
December 1992.
The plan of action and milestones for the billet review
provided by OP- 06 is summarized as follows:
• May 92, OP-60, 01, 095
Establish guidelines for reporting of Selres functional
requirements
.
• JUN 92, OP-60
Brief manpower claimants and resource sponsors on review
guidelines.
• JUL-AUG 92, OP- 06
Meet with manpower claimants.
• JUN-SEPT 92, Manpower claimants
Review selres functional requirements.
• OCT 92, OP- 06, 01, 095, Resource sponsors
Review manpower claimants inputs of Selres functional
requirements
• NOV 92, OP-60 Total Force preview to PDRC
1. Recommend changes for Selres distributions and
reductions
2. Recommend new criteria for reserve validation
3
.
Make recommendations on structuring reserve functions
into crisis response/contributory support
• DEC 92, OP-60
Brief CNO decision meeting. (CNO, June 1992)
The INRC represents the first major restructuring of the
Naval Reserve since the consolidation of the 1970s. Current
fiscal realities, as well as changes in the strategic threat,
mandate a more efficient utilization of the Naval Reserve.
The INRC model argues that efficient utilization can best be
achieved through increased contributory support to the active
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forces rather than mobilization training for the increasingly
remote possibility of global war.
The implementation process of some of the recommendations
made under the INRC model has yet to address the implicit
organizational changes necessary to effect such changes.
Incorporation of TQL concepts of organizational management
recommended by the INRC implies a change to a smaller,
decentralized Naval Reserve as an integral component of the
active GCs, allowing reserve units to be more responsive to
the "needs of the customer." Additionally, the INRC
recommends that new training and readiness standards must be
developed to reflect the new roles and missions of the Naval
Reserve.
These issues as well as recommendations incorporated from
the MAT report will be discussed and summarized in the final
chapter.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The changed world order and present downsizing of the
active forces necessitate a restructuring of the missions of
the reserve forces . Greater dependency on reserve forces is
consistent with the national tradition of "citizen soldier,
especially during a time of decreased strategic threat.
Despite DOD recommendations to the contrary, it is not likely
that Congress will consider large cuts in the reserve force in
the foreseeable future.
To effectively implement Total Force and the New National
Military Strategy concepts of reserve integration and support
for the active force, the Naval Reserve must change its
emphasis and performance criteria from "mobilization training"
to contributory support and contingency response.
The organizational difficulties identified in the MAT
report, the lessons learned from Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm as well as the recommendations adopted
from the Innovative Naval Reserve concept all serve as drivers
for structural change within the Naval Reserve.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Drawing from the aforementioned analysis, the following
broad recommendations are made in the areas of management,
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organization, ADP infrastructure, mobilization, manpower, and
training.
1 . MANAGEMENT
The implications of greater integration with gaining
commands are that the present reserve administrative
"management structure" (both SELRES and TAR) must be re-
validated. The present regulations governing reserve drill
and active duty for training should be revised to facilitate
increased flexibility and responsiveness to gaining command
requirements. It is recommended that all reserve managers
possess individual leadership skills and demonstrated
managerial experience to meet the leadership and management
challenges identified in the MAT. To facilitate those goals,
realistic career incentives, formalized screening, and
standards of performance should be established.
2. ORGANIZATION
As recommended by the MAT, the unified COMNAVRESFOR
structure in New Orleans should be eliminated. In its place,
separate air and surface reserve commands should be maintained
in New Orleans, with both commands reporting directly to the
Director of Naval Reserve (OP-095) in Washington, D.C. These
new stand-alone organizations would only share administrative
support resources. The staffs and organizational structure of
the separate air and surface reserve commands should mirror
the functional staffs of their active duty counterparts and
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resource sponsors. All Naval Reserve organizations, down to
and including the individual augment units, should be
organized to eliminate duplicate command and administrative
functions. These changes would be consistent with the
objectives of decentralization implied in the INRC.
3. ADP INFRASTRUCTURE
A complete re-engineering of the reserve ADP structure
is needed to develop a management information system geared to
the needs of the user. The management information system
should maximize the use of prevailing technology, allowing for




Recall procedures should be developed and exercised to
reflect realistic use of reserve manpower short of full
mobilization. Once qualified in a particular mobilization
billet, individual reservists should be retained in that
billet indefinitely, if possible.
5 . MANPOWER
Proposals for the movement of reserve billets to both
coasts should be examined thoroughly with the understanding
that population size and growth rates alone do not necessarily
translate into readily identifiable regions of available
manpower. Demographic and econometric studies should be
conducted to predict the quantity and quality of available
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manpower for both the long and short term. Results from these
studies should be used to identify both the numbers and
locations of reserve billets.
6 . TRAINING
Accountability for reserve readiness should be
transferred to the gaining commands. A need exists to develop
a methodology to translate active duty contributory support
into a quantifiable measurement of readiness.
The actual modifications in reserve force structure
will be contingent on the manpower and funding levels approved
by Congress. It remains to be seen what recommendations (if
any) Congress chooses to adopt from Rand's Active Reserve Mix
Study due to be released in December 1992.
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